Turkey had accepted Syrian refugees in such numbers, and in the manner it has, partly due, not just to its proximity to the conflict in Syria, but also to the fact it had recently been overhauling its immigration systems to meet international standards (with an eye on EU membership in the future). Being part way through these reforms may have added to Turkey's uneven response to the growing waves of refugee migration.

With a Syrian refugee population of 2.7 million and rising, this is very far from the temporary population who would return to their homes in Syria very soon that was expected back in 2011, when few imagined the civil war would last this long. Turkey's existing immigration law had allowed for th recognition of refugee status but not for the settlement of refugees. Once refugee status was recognised, the migrant should be settled in a third country. Pressure from the EU has been a powerful indentive to change this attitude but in practise the sheer volume of Syrian refugees has forced Turkey to acomdate them as best they can, in refugee camps and in society at large.

Turkey has also supported NGOs providing refugee camps within Syria for the internall dispaced, partly to prevent the need of refugees to head to Turkey. However, they have had a relatively open door policy to their neighbours in Syria.

Turkey, like Greece, has been used as a gateway by some Syrian refugees to reach Europe, where they might have a chance of a better life, or be reunited with family or friends. Policing the borders has incurred costs for Turkey, as it has for finanially crippled Greece, and being proative in taking refugees directly from Turkish refugee camps might relieve some of the pressure that causes refugees to leave of thir own accord, puttng money into the hands of people traffickers and costing the Turkish authorities more in terms of policing or coast guard call outs.